Equipoise and Freedom in Leibniz
Leibniz, Classical Theism, and the Problem of Evil - Chapter 6 (3 of 4)
Greetings, subscribers. As followers of Theological Letters know, I recently finished my forthcoming book on Leibniz and the problem of evil, and I have been posting fresh installments from that work every Sunday.
To date, I have posted the Introduction and all of Part I — Chapters 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 — as well as the first two installments of chapter 6. Today, I post the third installment of Chapter 6, Equipoise and Freedom in Leibniz.
If you have yet to read all that comes before, I recommend you do so for context. Links to all prior sections are below. Be watching for the final installment of Chapter 6 next Sunday. Enjoy!
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Equipoise and Freedom in Leibniz
A centerpiece of every determinist reading of Leibniz is his rejection of indifference. To name just a couple of examples, when building his case for psychological determinism, Russell harps on the point, “[Leibniz] rejected entirely the liberty of indifference ... and even held this to be self-contradictory. For it is necessary that every event should have a cause, though it is contingent that the cause should produce its effect. He held also that the indifference of equilibrium would destroy moral good and evil.”1 Likewise, when making his case that Leibniz’s distinctions between inclining influences and determining influences fails, Loemker pinpoints indifference as the reason. Having rejected the idea that the will is ever in a state of equilibrium, whatever inclines the will determines its choice.2
The interpretive trend is an early one. In the 1700s, many began to equate indifference with equipoise, thereby deeming equipoise essential to libertarian freedom. Any who deny equipoise deny freedom.3 We can see this trend quite clearly in two very prominent figures, Voltaire and Thomas Reid.
In addition to mocking Leibniz’s “optimism” in Candide, Voltaire expresses distaste for Leibniz’s compatibilism.4 When discussing the differences between Newton’s God and Leibniz’s God, Voltaire raises the worry that PSR threatens the indifference of the will, which Voltaire sees as indispensable to libertarian choice.5 Elsewhere, Voltaire discusses Leibniz’s claim that “liberty of indifference is a term void of meaning”6 and argues that without indifference, every act is just an expression of the underlying nature. So our choices are inevitable, if not necessary.7
Reid displays similar leanings. He recognizes that Leibniz’s opposition to equipoise is rooted in the “schoolmen” (i.e., the scholastics) — a point we will return to shortly.8 Like Voltaire, Reid thinks that without equipoise, the sufficient reason for a choice is the chooser’s nature, a conclusion that leads to determinism.9 And this line of argument continues to pervade readings of Leibniz from the 1700s on into the present.10
Reid’s observation that Leibniz echoes the scholastics is both correct and critical. For the reduction of indifference to equipoise by Leibniz’s critics displays a misunderstanding of the scholastic background. In the evolution of scholastic views on freedom, several forms of indifference are discussed. Equipoise is one of many. And there are plenty who affirm libertarian freedom while rejecting equipoise.
Let’s begin by returning to MFP. Toward the close of our previous chapter, we touched on the divide between the intellectualists and the voluntarists. Both schools of thought acknowledge a distinction between the intellect and the will. Both grant that the intellect makes judgments about available options, assessing the best means to the desired end. Both admit that the will makes choices, acting on judgments. And both also admit that the act of choosing springs from spontaneity, a free act of self-determination in which the subject chooses or rejects a course of action. What distinguishes the intellectualist from the voluntarist is that the intellectualist believes the will is a blind follower of the intellect. So the will must act on the intellect’s final judgment, since it has no basis for doing otherwise. The voluntarist, by contrast, insists that the will may choose or reject these judgments. Such was the divide we observed in the contrast between Thomas Aquinas, on the one hand, and Henry of Ghent, on the other.11
Now, the first major development of note in this discussion comes from John Duns Scotus. Prior to Scotus, both intellectualists and voluntarists presume that choice is binary, choose (volo) or reject (nolo).12 Scotus diagnoses the problem of psychological determinism that follows. If choice is reduced to choose or reject, and if the will desires the good, then choice is mere perception. So long as the object is perceived to be good, the choice follows.13 In other words, the result is psychological determinism. For this reason, Scotus expands considerably the dynamics of freedom.
Like Ghent, Scotus is a voluntarist. But Scotus says the capacities of the will go beyond rejecting the final judgment of the intellect. The will is able to direct the intellect, press deliberation further, redirect to alternatives, and desist the considered choice altogether.14 In addition, he makes the case that no perceived good can compel the will into action.15 And for this reason, one capacity of will is to suspend choice: The will can choose (volo), reject (nolo), or not choose (non volo).16 The binary, choose or reject, Ghent refers to as freedom of contradiction while the power to refrain Scotus calls freedom of contrariety.17
A further development in the discussion concerns indifference (indifferentia). Two different meanings emerge prior to the Reformation era. The one meaning is traceable, again, to Scotus. He uses indifference to describe libertarian powers of choice — the potential to choose, reject, or not choose, along with the other capacities described above.18 The same meaning appears in other voluntarists, such as William of Ockham, who says such powers are the basis for moral culpability.19
A second meaning of indifference emerges around the same time with Peter John Olivi. Olivi’s meaning comes closer to equipoise. He describes scenarios in which two choices are essentially identical. — Two dates of identical quality hang from a tree. Which to choose? Two identical coins sit on a table. Which to choose? — Olivi praises the will for being able to break such ties. And this ability is what he calls freedom of indifference.20 In this context, we find one of the earliest echoes of Buridan’s ass.21 The thought experiment describes a donkey who stands between two bales of hay of equal size and luster. Unable to see a difference, the donkey is unable to choose and thus starves to death. Olivi notes that the beast lacks reason. Being moved by appetite, it requires an imbalance of appetite in order to choose. But reason supplies free choice, which has the power of indifference, by which Olivi means the capacity to break ties (ironically) without a reason.22
In the post-Reformation era, we find yet another form of indifference, the notorious equipoise. This indifference is typically traced to Spanish Jesuit, Luis de Molina. Molina’s view bears a certain likeness to Olivi’s indifference, as it ascribes to the will the capacity to choose from a state of equilibrium. However, Molina makes this equipoise the central trait of freedom. For a choice to be free, equipoise must remain even in the choosing. In other words, the will not only deliberates from a state of equipoise but retains its equipoise when making a choice.23
This background sets the stage for the post-Reformation scholastic discussions on freedom, which were highly influential on Leibniz.24 Standard in these disputes is an exploration of several types of indifference.25 One type identifies libertarian powers. Here is the freedom of contradiction, the freedom of contrariety, and the freedom of specification. The first of these (contradiction) refers to the binary choice presumed by early scholastics, while the latter two refer to the additional powers discussed by Scotus.
Two further types of indifference named are moral indifference and freedom of equipoise. The former refers to a being’s capacity to do either good or evil. This indifference is typically thought of as a deficient form of freedom. God, being perfectly Good, does not have “freedom” to do good or evil — nor do the Saints, after attaining beatitude. Creatures with this “freedom” have it because they are in process: Not yet being perfect in goodness, the creature has the capacity to retreat from goodness into corruption. Hence, this indifference is not a positive power but a privative one, resulting from its lack of perfection.
Freedom of equipoise refers to the indifference ascribed to Molina. Many post-Reformation scholastics accept the first type of indifference (ascribed to all free beings) and the second (ascribed to corruptible creatures) but reject the third. A common complaint with equipoise amongst these writers is that it results in a contradiction. As mentioned, the will was viewed as “self-determining,” and MFP understands the intellect to connect means with ends. So choice is a volitional act of determination (determinisme) — that is, choice “concerning an end” (de termino).26 In other words, when one makes a choice concerning an end, he is now self-determined, and from this determination, the act follows. Equipoise offers the strange suggestion that the will is innately indeterminate. And herein lies the contradiction: The will is indeterminate when self-determined.
Key to recognize is that many scholastics who reject equipoise are exceedingly clear that they are libertarians. Franciscus Gomarus, for example, rejects equipoise but is clear that he affirms indifference in the libertarian sense. He, first, critiques compatibilism by saying that freedom from coercion is an insufficient definition of freedom, since even dogs and falling rocks are uncoerced. Gomarus then goes on to say that free choice requires the real possibility of an alternative choice, all things remaining the same, including the chooser’s knowledge of the act. The condition is explicitly libertarian, being a clear insistence on PAP. And Gomarus adds that the act cannot be reduced to a movement of habit; it must be spontaneous, by which he means from an inner potency to choose or not, to produce or not produce the act.27
Gomarus is far from an outlier in this line of thinking. These very same points echo in Gomarus’ pupil, Gisbertus Voetius, for example. Worth noting is that to these points Voetius adds a familiar complaint, often proclaimed by Leibniz: Equipoise is a chimera.28