Renown rationalist G. W. Leibniz (in)famously answered the problem of evil by insisting that our world is the best of all possible worlds. I’ve just finished my book on Leibniz’s “optimism” for Cambridge University Press. As shocking as his claim is, my book argues that Leibniz’s reasoning is virtually impossible for classical theists to avoid.
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Introduction
All Nature is but Art, unknown to thee;
All Chance, Direction, which thou canst not see;
All Discord, Harmony not understood;
All partial evil, universal good;
And Spite of Pride, in erring Reason’s Spite,
One truth is clear, WHATEVER IS, IS RIGHT.
— Alexander Pope1
On November 1, 1755, faithful Christians of Lisbon gathered for mass on All Saints Day. Sounds of morning worship filled the sanctuary. Then, a new sound rose beneath the chorus — the rumble of an earthquake. The very walls that echoed with worship of God moments earlier collapsed, killing the faithful. The whole of Lisbon was razed to the ground. And on the heels of the horrific event followed a tsunami, fires, and civil unrest. Thousands died. News of untold devastation spread across Europe, raising in the minds of many a common question: Why would God allow such evil?
In the wake of the devastation, French poet and philosopher, Voltaire, began work on a satirical story, Candide.2 The would-be classic relentlessly mocks the “optimism” of famed rationalist G. W. Leibniz (1646-1716). Leibniz (in)famously argued in his Theodicy that our world is the best of all possible worlds, a “best” that includes the innumerable evils God permits. Voltaire highlights the apparent absurdity of the theory with the story of Pangloss, a teacher of metaphysico-theologo-cosmolonigology, charged with the education of Candide. As Pangloss and Candide explore the world, they are beaten, tortured, maimed, starved, and burned. But through it all, Pangloss parrots the brilliant Leibniz: It is all for the best.
Voltaire’s cynical take on Leibniz’s theory is far from an outlier. Most who encounter his defense of God, or “theodicy,”3 find it absurd on the face of it. How could a world with theft, rape, murder, war, disease, tyranny, and daily atrocity possibly be the best of all worlds? Surely, the prevention of even one evil would make our world better, and such prevention is certainly within reach of an omnipotent God. So, while there is no shortage of defenders of God, few entertain Leibniz’s theodicy.
Despite the unpalatability of Leibniz’s optimism, I do not believe his conclusion is so easily dismissed. In fact, I think his theodicy is inevitable for adherents to classical theism. I will make this case in the pages to follow by laying bare Leibniz’s reasoning, showing its precedent in his Christian antecedents, and correcting ubiquitous distortions of his theodicy.