Are Inaccurate Images of Christ Not Images of Christ?

Theological Letters

“Dusty” wrote to me with an objection to icons that he heard in a Presbyterian Sunday School class. The minister insisted that icons are a violation of the second commandment. “Dusty,” having read my article on John of Damascus,¹ offered replies in line with John’s case. The minister replied by saying that we don’t know what Christ looked like, so images of Christ are not in fact of Christ. He drew the comparison with carrying around a photo of a woman to whom I’m not married and telling people she’s my wife. “Dusty” thought on the reply and, days later, realized that this objection does not address the points he was raising (i.e., the Incarnation means the Son of God is now visible). Nonetheless, “Dusty” was curious what I would say to the objection, despite it missing the point. Below is my reply. If you’re reading this letter, then you must be a paying subscriber. Thank you for your support! (If somehow you’ve accessed this and you’re not a paying subscriber, please consider supporting my work.)

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Dear “Dusty,”

Thanks for your email and for your kind remarks on my article about John of Damascus. I'm glad you found it helpful!

In answer to your question, I would offer just a few points. The first is that you are correct, the minister's reply indeed sidesteps the question you asked. His strategy is what, in logic, is called a red herring, which is a logical fallacy. The term refers to an old practice of dragging a herring across a path when training hunting dogs. The test was to see if the dog could keep focused on the scent it was supposed to be tracking or whether it would get distracted by the smell of the fish. (Whether this practice is apocryphal or not, I don't know, but that's the supposed background of the term.) The original question you asked was whether an image of Christ violates the second commandment. The minister's retort raises an entirely different question, namely, whether an image that is not of Christ but is viewed as such violates the commandment. These are two different issues. 

I won't rehash the case in favor of icons. Since you've read my piece on John of Damascus, you've read my overview of John's defense of icons. Assuming I've read you correctly, the new challenge this minister is raising is this: We do not know what Christ looked like, so any image we make of him will not be of him but of some imaginary figure whom we call Christ; hence the image will still be idolatrous, since it will not in fact be an image of the Incarnate Son of God but of our imaginary Christ. 

The key presumptions of this objection are two: (1) We do not know what Christ looked like, and (2) an image is an image of someone if and only if it accurately resembles them. Let's start with the second point. 

I find the claim to be an interesting one, primarily because it raises a host of fascinating issues about image-archetype relations, a topic that I think is underexplored but is rich with philosophical importance.² Rather than beginning with representational images — that is, 2D or 3D attempts to capture the person's likeness — I'd like to start with non-representational representations. To wit, names and symbols. 

I want to start here for two reasons. The first is that, from what I can tell, the image-archetype connection that is central to the iconodule position also applies to names and symbols. Second, if I am correct on this, names and symbols provide an obvious counterpoint to presumption (2). For they demonstrate that the archetype-image connection need not be based on an accurate representation of the archetype's appearance. 

By way of review, you'll recall from my article that John presumes a connection between the image and its archetype, and I discuss the background of this claim. In Plato, we see a discussion of the difference between non-substantial images (e.g., shadows), on the one hand, and substantial images (e.g., a reflection), on the other. When considering the nature of a substantial image, Plato notices that an essential feature of an image is that it is referential: It is the image of (name the archetype). Hence, there is an essential connection between an image and that which it images. Admittedly, the relationship is one sided; the image is dependent upon its archetype, not vice versa, but there is an essential connection between the two nonetheless. If memory serves, I also note in that article that this connection is recognized in the Old Testament itself. The exposition of the second commandment in Deuteronomy (here using the Septuagint, as the fathers did) does not use the word "idol" (eidōlo) but "likeness" (homoiōma). And the evident concern of the passage is that, because God is invisible and thus has no likeness, to worship the likeness of another is to fall into idolatry, offering worship not to your God but to the archetype of the likeness you make — be a celestial body, an animal, or a man. Hence, the notion of a connection between image and archetype is something that seems to be presumed in the OT prohibitions on idolatry.

Images, however, are not the only thing for which the OT presumes such a connection. Names seem to also display the same type of connection. That is to say, the very same connection between a likeness and the one who it is like seems to apply to names as well. A name, like a likeness, is essentially referential, being the name of something. Georges Berguer has made the case that, amongst ancient religions generally, names were seen as an image or replica of sorts, substantially distinct from that which they name but nonetheless connected to the archetype — very much in line with the image-archetype connection. We can see this theme throughout the Old Testament in both positive and negative ways. In the positive sense, if the name of God is invoked upon a country or person, then that place or person belongs to Yahweh; the name itself creates a connection with God, whose name is upon that person or place (e.g., Gen 48:16; Dt 28:10; Am 9:12). In the negative sense, we see this in the OT prohibitions on the names of the "gods." The Israelites are strictly warned by God not to invoke the names of other gods, not even uttering their names (e.g., Ex 23:13). 

Symbols provide yet another ancient example of a visual indicator of a being who is not represented according to likeness. We might think, for example, of the Ankh, for the goddess Isis, or the scarab, which symbolized not only recreation or resurrection but also the god Khepri. In neither case is the god depicted. Nonetheless, the symbol is an indicator of that god. And just as the OT prohibits the utterance of the names of the god, it also prohibits the use of such symbols in its prohibitions on talacements and magic (Lev 19:26; 20:27). 

As an aside, I think it is worth noting that there is a growing body of literature on demonology in the Ancient Near East generally and the Old Testament specifically. In the light of such scholarship, it seems increasingly clear that the OT names a great many demons and tends to see the gods, not as imaginative figments of human invention, but as fallen angels. Hence, the concern about using their names, their symbols, and their images is because these names, symbols, and images are connected to real beings. 

Lest I get into a tangent on demonology, which is always a tempting tangent for me, I'll return to my main point. The minister's presumption (2) seems to be problematic in the light of ancient names and symbols. For the presumption is that the connection between image and archetype is based on or contingent upon accurate visual representation. Hence, if the portrayal of Christ is inaccurate in its representation, then it is not an image of Christ. But the fact that names and symbols have an image-archetype connection and yet have no representation of likeness whatsoever seems to problematize this presumption.  

Now, perhaps one could reply that once a visual representation of one's appearance enters the equation, resemblance now matters. Perhaps images or likenesses, being representations of the person's appearance, require accuracy to qualify as an image of that person. Let's consider this possibility.