Today I signed a contract with Cambridge University Press for a book on G. W. Leibniz and the problem of evil. The manuscript is due March 1, 2023, so it will be some time before this appears in print. Nonetheless, for those following my work, this offers an inside glimpse of things to come. Below is the outline of chapters. For those interested in this topic, I will follow this post with a pair of letters on Leibniz. Please subscribe and support my work!
THE INEVITABILITY OF LEIBNIZ
On the Merits and Limitations of Leibniz’s Theory of the Best
by Nathan A. Jacobs
Introduction
We will offer an overview of the aims of the book; look at the context that gives rise to it; provide a roadmap for the case to follow; and supply a brief summary of the conclusions at which I will arrive.
1. Sufficient Reason and the Best
We will begin by offering a clear and concise summary of how Leibniz’s theory of the best unfolds. Beginning with the context of Modern philosophy, and specifically disputes between the empiricists and the rationalists, we look at Leibniz’s Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR) and why this principle leads him to the conclusion that empiricism is insufficient to explain our world. Instead, PSR leads Leibniz to the conclusion that the only sufficient reason for existential realities is an existential analytic truth, a conclusion that points to God. Yet, we will see that this reply, in itself, fails to answer PSR. We must also find an analytic answer for why God wills the things that he does. And here, we arrive at the principle of the best: From the classical divine attributes emerges the hypothetical necessity that whatever God does, he does because it is best. Hence, if he wills to create a world, as he has ours, it follows that such a world is the best of all possible worlds. Such a conclusion, however, naturally raises the problem of evil, a problem that is more analytically potent when framed by Leibniz’s theory than without it. Hence, we will survey the essential components of how Leibniz reconciles the theory of the best with the reality of evil.
2. The Problem of Divine and Creaturely Freedom in Leibniz
Leibniz’s theory, as fleshed out in chapter 1, naturally raises questions concerning free will: Does God have free will? And, if not, does this divine necessity distribute to creatures, making us equally determined? The traditional readings of Leibniz tend toward the pessimistic. God does not have free will, in Leibniz’s system, if, by this, we mean contrary choice. And, by extension, creaturely free will is equally determined. The only real question is how hard or soft the determinism Leibniz espouses is: Is he a hard determinist, espousing superessentialism in both God and creatures? Or is he a compatibilist, who denies contrary choice, but defines free will in such a manner that uncoerced self-movement is a sufficient definition of free will? We will look at the numerous claims that Leibniz makes concerning divine decree, substance, and the nature of contingent truths that seem to confirm the determinist reading. We will see that, in the seemingly idiosyncratic worldview that emerges, determinism certainly appears to loom large over the whole.
3. The Problem of Divine Choice Before Leibniz
As a first step in defending Leibniz, we will look at the precedent before Leibniz for both his theory of the best and for the problem of divine freedom. We will see that the notion that God guides all things toward the good, and even the best, was a rather standard feature of the idea of providence in both pagan and Christian antiquity, as well as amongst medieval scholastics — a fact of which Leibniz is well aware. As for the hypothetical necessity that if God wills something, he wills the best — a claim that seems to undermine contrary choice in God — we will see that the problem this claim represents has clear precedent in the Christian tradition before Leibniz. Though the pagan philosophers tended to speak about divine will but not about divine choice, the ancient and medieval Christians were committed to divine freedom in the sense of contrary choice. Yet, asserting that God has free will is easier said than demonstrated. We will look at the Latin medieval discussion on the topic, noting the various approaches of the intellectualists, on the one hand, and the voluntarists, on the other. What is apparent in the discussion is that both camps see a commitment to divine freedom as critical to Christianity, but equally apparent are the challenges that both camps face in seeking to avoid the pitfalls of divine necessitarianism. Hence, while Leibniz’s theory raises serious challenges for whether God can have the power of contrary choice, it is not Leibniz’s theory but the commitments of classical Latin Christianity more generally that create the problem.
4. An Alternative Reading of Leibniz
Chapter 4 will open by looking at a singularly unique, speculative hypothesis, proposed by R. Cranston Paull. Paull looks at the catalogue of Leibnizian claims that appear to require determinism and demonstrates that each claim could be read in a way that permits libertarian free will. Paull does not suggest that Leibniz is in fact a libertarian; he simply shows that nothing in Leibniz’s claims requires a rejection of liberatarian free will. With this speculative hypothesis before us, we will look at historical reasons to think that this speculative proposal may in fact have historical teeth. In particular, we will zero in on shifts happening in Leibniz’s day on the topic of free will. These shifts introduce highly innovative litmus tests for libertarian freedom that are entirely contrary to more classical scholastic sensibilities. Considering the possibility that Leibniz is an old soul (or monad) who’s sensibilities resonate with classical scholastic assumptions, over against the innovations of his day, we will look at the alternative reading that emerges, taking the position that Leibniz may in fact be a libertarian. We will see how this reading helps resolve tensions in Liebniz’s thought. Rereading Leibniz in this more classical manner and in the light of his theological antecedents, we will see a variety of new interpretative avenues open for this theory of the best.
5. The Inevitability of Leibniz
Having shown that the challenges of divine freedom are not unique to Leibniz and made the case that Leibniz may be far more traditional than typically presumed, we take the final step in our defense. In chapter 5, we explore attempts in contemporary philosophy of religion to evade the Leibnizian conclusion. We look at both direct attempts to avoid the theory of the best with regard to divine volitional as well as alternative theodicies that, after rejecting Leibniz, posit their own solutions. We will see that the former efforts to evade Leibniz either fail or require commitments that are not obviously more desirable than the Leibnizian conclusion. Regarding the latter, we will see that these contemporary alternative theodicies either reject Leibniz only to parrot him (e.g., Plantinga) or reject Leibniz only to posit an alternative theodicy that Leibniz could himself embrace as a viable species within his genus of his theodicy (e.g., Hick). The net result is that there appears to be something inevitable about Leibniz’s conclusions within Western theism generally and Western Christianity specifically.
6. Moving Beyond Leibniz?
Having established the apparent inevitability of Leibniz’s system, I explore two ways forward. The First is that one not move beyond Leibniz at all but embrace him. If it is correct that the theodicies of today represent species of the Leibnizian genus, perhaps this fact should not cause one to blush, but rather to embrace Leibniz. Leibniz, in this light, provides a general framework for the problem of evil, while the various theodicies of today become particularized applications under this broader approach. The alternative is to move beyond Leibniz. Here, I focus on the required first step in doing so, namely, parting ways with the classical Western theism that Leibniz presumes. In this avenue, I explore the options of process philosophy, and process like approaches, which part ways with classical divine attributes. Yet, for more traditional theists, I also consider the ways in which Eastern Christianity, as found in the Eastern Church fathers, may afford its own traditional alternative to the Leibnizian framework, albeit a different tradition. Looking at Eastern distinctives on divine simplicity, its rejection of divine essentialism, and other such distinctives, I suggest that the Christian East may afford an escape hatch from the Leibnizian vessel, while still remaining within a traditional Christian framework of some kind. In this light, I lay bare avenues that show promise for further study.