In early February, I announced that I’m writing a book on the notorious “optimism” G. W. Leibniz — his belief that our world is the best of all possible worlds. I began posting chapters as I finished them, offering a sizable preview to free subscribers and the complete manuscript to paid subscribers.
I’m pleased to announce that the volume is now complete! All of the chapters have now been updated to reflect the finished manuscript. Below, I’ve included links (click the chapter heading) and descriptions of each chapter.
A word to my readers: Even if you are not interested in Leibniz, if you’re interested in the problem of evil, there’s a lot in this book for you. Consider giving it a read.
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I open by introducing Leibniz’s optimism and discussing its rather cynical reception. I, then, introduce the thesis of the volume: Leibniz’s theory is inevitable for proponents of classical theism.
I show how Leibniz’s theory follows from his commitments to the Principle of Sufficient Reason and classical theism. The former prompts Leibniz to trace every contingency to God, and the latter leads him to conclude that God always does the best. So the reason our world exists is because it’s the best possible world.
The theory of the best raises a common worry about Leibniz’s case: Perhaps all that happens is absolutely necessary. I flesh out the reasons why Leibniz’s theory threatens divine freedom and, by extension, creaturely freedom.
I examine Leibniz’s antecedents and show the ample precedent for the theory of the best amongst ancient and medieval advocates of providence, pagan and Christian. And in these writers, we also find the problems for freedom. So, while the problems are real, they are not Leibniz’s invention.
I examine the near-universal assumption that Leibniz is a determinist and offer reasons to think this standard assumption is false. I argue that Leibniz is a voluntarist with libertarian commitments and showing how this affects his claims about divine and creaturely choice.
I take a fresh look at Leibniz’s theodicy, showing how his commitments to libertarian freedom color his claims about possible worlds, free choice, and the best. The end result is a theodicy very different from the common caricature.
I look at alternatives to Leibniz and show how neither the alternatives to his theodicy nor the alternatives to the best succeed in escaping the Leibnizian conclusion. In the end, I conclude that Leibniz’s theodicy is in some sense inevitable for classical theism.